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:

Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from an Order of restitution resulting from a conviction for Attempted
Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (2003), and
Attempted Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Judith Athcrton, presiding.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v,

:

COREY EDWARD HARVELL,

:

Case No. 20070967-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
POINT. RESTITUTION IS INAPPROPRIATE WHERE AN INSUFFICIENT
NEXUS EXISTS BETWEEN THE DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE ADMITTED
CRIMINAL CONDUCT.

Under the restitution statute applicable in criminal proceedings, "[a] court may
order restitution only if the defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in
pecuniary damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal conduct. State
v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273, T|3, 987 P.2d 1289 (emphasis added); see aho Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-20l(4)(a) (Supp. 2008). While restitution has several purposes, restitution is
appropriate only for "the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the
offense of conviction." Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 41 K 413 (1990). Hence,
restitution cannot be awarded where the conduct underlying the criminal offense is too
far removed from the damage or in situations where the damage would have occurred
despite the defendant's conduct. S^e Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^[4-5 (requiring

defendant's admitted conduct to bear "sufficient nexus" to damages claimed by victim
before restitution can be ordered). Even the State's argument that Mr. Ilarvcll could be
held liable under a civil claim for conversion requires a showing that the damages were
"sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong." State's Response
Br. 13. Furthermore, no reliable evidence establishes a sufficient nexus between Mr.
IlarvclFs admitted criminal conduct and the damages claimed by Ms. Loscc; therefore
the trial court erred in ordering restitution for brake replacement and damaged property
inside the vehicle.
To establish a sufficient nexus between the damages suffered by a victim and a
defendant's admitted criminal conduct, a sentencing judge must determine that 'liability
is clear as a matter of law and [that] commission of the crime clearly establishes causality
of the injury or damages." State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
("The issues of fault and proximate cause are crucial in determining damages in a civil
case."). The law is clear that a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution "for
criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not
convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.** State v. Bicklcy, 2002 UT App 342, ^]9,
60 P.3d 582. The same formalities required before admissions supporting a guilty plea
can be entered into the record govern the admissions supporting restitution. Watson,
' 1999 UT App 273 at^|5.
For the purposes of determining the basis for restitution, the admission of a
defendant is essentially the same as a plea of guilty that would support a
conviction, but a judgment of conviction is not entered because of a pica
2

bargain. Because such an admission can result in liability for substantial
sums of money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities ought
to be firmly established.
Id. (citation omitted).
The state's offer of support for its argument fails to take into consideration the
heightened standard of insuring that restitution is based on firmly established admissions.
Instead, the State erroneously argues that restitution is appropriate because Mr. Ilarvell
did not make a specific objection to each itemized repair given relating to the brake repair
and the triple hearsay statements made in Ms. Losec's letter that she "was told |hcrj car
was finally recovered when someone reported seeing it being driven recklessly." R. 45;
Losee ltr. As the record supports, Mr. Ilarvell clearly objected to the lump sum Ms.
Loscc submitted for her vehicle repairs totaling $539.24. R. 87:4 (defense counsel
"takfing] issue" with the amount of vehicle repair in "that the repair that was made,
is a brake replacement."). Moreover, the triple hearsay statements supporting that Ms.
Loscc\s vehicle was driven recklessly arc not remotely reliable in establishing that it was
Mr. Ilarvell who was seen driving the vehicle, let alone reliable enough to firmly
establish a sufficient nexus to Mr. Harvell. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071
(Utah 1993) ("Although hearsay evidence can be admissible in a sentencing proceeding,
double hearsay is so inherently unreliable and presents such a high probability for
inaccurac} that it cannot stand alone as a basis for sentencing.").
Due process under both the state and federal constitution "requires criminal
proceedings including sentencing to be based upon accurate and reasonably reliable
3

information." State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^8. 12 P.3d 110. Because a defendant's
responsibility must be firmly established like that of a guilty plea, restitution must be
based on more than unsubstantiated triple hearsay statements and "gotcha" arguments
where a defendant sufficiently objects to the sum total of a brake repair rather than each
of its individual parts. Such arguments undermine the due process requirement that the
trial court's determination in clearly establishing a sufficient nexus v*be based upon
accurate and reasonably reliable information." Id.
As argued in Mr. Harvell's opening brief, a sufficient nexus does not exist that Mr.
Harvell's admitted criminal responsibility of attempted possession of the vehicle for a
very limited duration "resulted in" the brake damage rather than a result of regular wear
and tear on a vehicle. Ms. Losee's triple hearsay statements that she was told that
someone saw her vehicle being driven recklessly are not the type of reliable evidence
needed to firmly establish Mr. Harvell's liability. Moreover, Mr. HarvelPs admitted
conduct does not establish any nexus to the broken IPOD. Mr. Ilarvcll did not admit to
the broader offense of stealing the vehicle but merely to attempting to possess it.
Therefore he "cannot be held to answer for all damages resulting from" the stolen
vehicle. State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,1118, 40 P.3d 1143.
CONCLUSION
As more fully set forth in the Opening Brief, Appellant, Corey Edward Ilarvcll,
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order imposing restitution for the brake
repair and broken IPOD.
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DEBRA M. NELSON
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Attorneys for Appellant
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